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 	In the survey of the philosophy of science in Italy I am going to carry out here, I surely cannot do without preliminarily dealing both with the “character” of Italian philosophy and with its relationships to science in general.  As a matter of fact I hold that the present Italian situation of this branch of learning –  no doubt in serious delay in comparison with so many other countries – is deeply rooted in an endemic character of our culture, radically rhetorical, humanistic and historicist. But you may rightly ask: does the philosophical thought of a nation really have a “character”? Does this not mean indulging too much in that “metaphilosophical” trend that in the end imposes unity and coherence on what is actually varied and heterogeneous?  Well, as far as I am concerned, speaking of a character in Italian philosophy does not mean carrying on a mere academic and posthumous exercise.  On the contrary, it also means calling back an aspect which, for historical and political reasons, has been alive, to a great extent, in Italian philosophy ever since the Eighteenth century, and particularly from the Nineteenth century Risorgimento and from Unity – Italy became a nation in 1860. It means recalling something that has played a normative and programmatic role in our culture. And it also means identifying a few sources that reveal themselves more lastingly influential and more important in the practice and in the institutionalization of our philosophy.
What I am going to show, is that Italy, in spite of the eminent scientists to be proud of from Galileo to nowadays, has never seen a really successful scientific culture (I mean, a pervasive scientific mentality, a ruling scientific worldview, and, for what matters here, a relevant scientifically oriented philosophy), and it has always felt the influence of old choices that have led it to construct an entrenched tradition which, through Vico, led from humanism to neo-idealism and to today’s predominant “post-modern” spirit; but, unlike other European cultures (in France, for example), it is a post-modernity that became established without any real “modernity” being established  beforehand. So, let us look at the story more closely.
Isaiah Berlin – I have chosen an English author on purpose, to enable you to obtain more easily information from the texts – writes, in Against the Current (1955), that at the origin of the “divorce” between science and humanistic culture there is Giambattista Vico, an Eighteenth century philosopher, and one of the most outstanding Italian thinkers. Berlin persuasively writes that “before the eighteenth century, there was … no sense of this contrast”. Vico was “by inclination a religious humanist with a rich historical imagination”, not in sympathy “with the great scientific materialist movement that was determined to sweep away the last relics of the scholastic metaphysics”. “His mind was not analytical or scientific but literary and intuitive”. In 1709, in an inaugural lecture which professors were obliged to give at the start of each academic year, Vico pronounced a passionate defence of humanist education, in which he celebrated the rich, traditional Italian “rhetoric”, “against the austere and deflationary style of the French rationalist science-influenced modernists”. Vico was anti-Cartesian, depreciated mathematics, which he never considered as a discovery, but a human invention, a sort of game; not a system of laws which governed reality, but a system of rules, in terms of which it was useful to generalise about, analyse and predict, the behaviour of things in space. Vico was also the advocate of an idea (as old as St. Augustine), that one could know fully only what oneself had made (verum factum est). In the world, in nature, there is something opaque which only God, who had made it, could know through and through. In Vico’s view, Berlin tells us, “men could know ‘from the inside’ only what they have made themselves and nothing else. The greater the man-made element in any object of knowledge, the more transparent to human vision it will be; the greater the ingredient of external nature, the more opaque and impenetrable to human understanding. There was an impassable gulf between the man-made and the natural: the constructed and the given”. Vico asserted that human history is the object men could know best, because it was made by men. For him, our knowledge is superior, at least in kind, about intentional behaviour – that is, action – to our knowledge of the movement or position of bodies in space. “It is therefore - Berlin observes - a pervasive kind of self-denial to apply the rules and laws of physics or of the other natural sciences to the world of mind and will and feeling; for by doing this we would be gratuitously debarring ourselves from much that we could know”. Giving up the ideal of a unified science, cherished by many spokesmen of the Enlightenment, Vico is an advocate of a knowledge with men as privileged observers; a knowledge by direct “consciousness”; a knowledge achieved through memory, and not by analogy or by inference of causes (Vico attributes to men, besides self-awareness, a faculty called “fantasia”, a sort of imaginative understanding, of imaginative insight; the capacity for conceiving more than one way of categorising reality, an ability “to get into the skin of others”). Vico believes that there is no immutable structure of experience; every culture and all people follow rules, principles, values, which we must comprehend by “entering” different minds, different natural modes of expression, that is, irreducibly different languages, myths, rites, metaphors (which Vico considers in principle not translatable into a plain, literal prose). After Wittgenstein and after contemporary hermeneutics, we could say that, for Vico, in order to understand other minds from the past we must place ourselves in their form of life, in their human condition. "This lies at the heart of the art or science of attribution: to tell what goes with one form of life cannot be achieved solely by inductive methods”. Philology and empirical inquiry, in general, must be subordinated to the purpose of “understanding”. They must sharpen our ability of Einfühlung, of empathy. They don’t get any knowledge by themselves.
The epistemological consequences of this view are: a radical relativism; an implicit instrumentalism, when we speak about the success of science, which never results in a cumulative growth of knowledge; the discrediting of analysis and of the cognitive value of mathematics (in spite of an advocated ontologism of Platonic and Pitagoric kind). After Vico there will be, on one side Marx or Condorcet to place history at the centre, although in an Enlightenment spirit (with a more impersonal and at the same time meta-historical concern; in the firm belief that human society could be studied by a human science in principle analogous to that which tells us about the behaviour of “bees or beavers” – to use Condorcet’s analogy). On the other side there will be Benedetto Croce, and earlier Coleridge or Carlyle, champions of a history men believe in and live by; a history of the life of Spirit, against the aberrant reductions imputed to the utilitarians and the positivists. “The specific and unique versus the repetitive and the universal - Berlin comments -, the concrete versus the abstract, perpetual movement versus rest, the inner versus the outer, quality versus quantity, culture-bound versus timeless principles, mental strife and self-transformation as a permanent condition of man versus the possibility (and desirability) of peace, order, final harmony and the satisfaction of all rational human wishes”. In brief, history as self-knowledge versus history as science; the former being a history incapable of ever becoming fully organized, and to be achieved – as Vico warned us – only “with great effort”. 
Berlin regards Vico as a great genius. He appears to him as the inventor of a new field of knowledge that includes social anthropology, comparative historical studies of philology, linguistics, ethnology, jurisprudence, literature, mythology. But he also regards as absolutely evident Vico’s dislike for natural science and his ignorance of the major scientific progress of his time.
Well, Vico’s philosophy – variously resumed and interpreted in the progress of decades – has become a point of reference when Italian philosophy has tried to acquire an identity of its own; and, at the same time, the “tutelary spirit” of an autoctonous tradition, to proudly take possession of, to claim the originality of, and the moral and ideal supremacy against foreign philosophical traditions. For more than one hundred years – incredibly enough – the main task of Italian philosophy has been that of commenting upon a few of Vico’s texts, and finding out – even by having recourse to archeological sources – elements which might uphold the ancient thesis of the primacy – moral, cultural and chronological – of Italian philosophy, enabled to find now in him its superior interpreter. I do not intend to bother you with the myth of an “Italic lore”, perhaps possession of the Pelasgics, or even of the Etruscans, that precedes the civilization of the ancient Greeks, and even constitutes its foundation. I will only mention the appreciated aspects of this rooted Italian wisdom – which is Pythagorean (Pythagoras, the “first philosopher”, is supposed to be Italian, and learns at Crotone the foundations of his thought), eclectic (Vincenzo Cuoco, a follower of Vico, argued that “in Italian philosophy is to be found both the union and the logical coordination of the principles of Empiricism or Sensism, Rationalism or Idealism”), superior (Croce’s saying that “problems produced elsewhere found their solutions in Italy” is widely known); it is also deeply moral and civic; it is political, according to the meaning Vico borrowed from Cicero; and often finds in the Fathers of the Church, as well as in Catholic piety, the fulfillment and the warranty of its primacy. 
Post-unity philosophies maintained the concern to find an identity for Italian thought. Almost everybody talked of “nationality” in philosophy, and deemed it necessary to anchor it in a well-established tradition. When people stopped speculating about the Etruscan-Pelasgian theme, and the mythic Italian Pythagoras, they were equally busy over the recognition of an identity, and again of a primacy of Italian philosophy. Bertrando Spaventa, the leader of the Nineteenth century Italian idealism, claimed that modern thought, originated in Italy and developed into the other European countries, eventually to come back home (and precisely to Naples). The problem now faced – previously surfaced by Vico himself – is that of finding a “new metaphysics” that should “lay the grounds for a new science, videlicet the science of Spirit”. Obviously it was German philosophy, the Hegelian one, to take on centrality as immediate referent. But, now, the Italian antecedent appeared to be present in Renaissance thought up to Vico. And even the positivists did not subtract themselves from presupposing this kind of genealogy. They were experimentalists, and pleaded the cause of a certain kind of empiricism as well as of the primacy of “facts”. But Roberto Ardigò himself, the most influential among the Italian positivist philosophers of the Nineteenth century, when he talked about sense and experiment, recalled Pomponazzi, Leonardo, Telesio, Bruno, Galileo, more than Mill or Comte: “Present-day positivism - he wrote - draws on the Italian philosophy that belongs to … [the Renaissance]. And particularly to Galileo’s. Because it is exactly from him that did stem those natural sciences which with their specific advancements have set the example to philosophy, and brought it back to the track of useful research. And it was Galileo the one who discovered the relativity of ideas” (please, notice the use of the term “useful” in order to characterize scientific and philosophical research, and the curious emphasis on Galileo’s “relativism”). 
It is instructive and important to pause awhile to reflect on what Italian positivism was like at the end of the Nineteenth century. It chiefly was an ideological movement before being philosophical.  It was an ideology of materialistic, anti-spitualistic and anti-clericalistic kind, with evident socialistic nuances.  It was an instrument of political propaganda, both of the liberals then in power, who cherished the idea that science was the effective ruler of the states, and of the anti-clerical socialists hostile to spiritualistic metaphysics. And it was ideologically functional to those emergent social productive groups that at that turn of history gave rise to the so-called “Italian first industrial revolution”. Italian positivism was a useful opening towards German physiology, cellulism and Darwinism. It has been of use for the growth – on a European level – of Italian biomedical science. As a matter of fact, the doctrines that benefited the new materialistic atmosphere that was breathed in post-unity Italy were medicine, biology, psychology, sociology, pedagogy – a discipline that found in Italy nourishment and unique importance in the western world –, but very little physics and no mathematical physics.  Above all, Italian positivism has resulted in a project of “civilization”, a bearer of naive progressivism, defective of theoretic elaboration. Apart from a few exceptions, the positivist philosophy of science, in Italy, is a mess where, together with a timid comparison with neo-Kantism and pragmatism (Giovanni Vailati) and with a few references – in general scarcely orthodox – to Ernst Mach, we find some ambiguous mingling with Naturphilosophie and Romantic science. In addition, we frequently observe in it an odium antiphilosophicum (hatred against philosophy) which Enrico Morselli himself, the positivist psychologist-psychiatrist, director of the “Rivista di filosofia scientifica”, notices and condemns as a “real strait-jacket of scientific outlook”. In the end, philosophy is entrusted only with unifying and preventing scientific knowledge from dispersing and breaking up.  No wonder, then, if in the course of a few years the Italian philosophical tradition – the one that, from Pythagoras to St.Augustine, and afterwards to Vico and Rosmini, had rejected materialism as a foreign body – prevails again. 
After positivism and what its enemies, misleadingly I mean, termed the “bankruptcy of science”, there followed, in Italy, a long period of just about unopposed sovereignty – also supported by the Fascist regime – of idealistic philosophies inspired by Hegel and the great German thought of the Nineteenth century up to Dilthey. Benedetto Croce is the philosopher with whom it was unavoidable to come to terms for more than half a century. It may be instructive to know what Croce’s concept of science was. Sciences are a mass of pseudo-concepts – empirical, the ones of natural sciences (representative, but lacking in universality), abstract, those of mathematics (universal, yes, but lacking in representations) which possess no cognitive character. They have a practical character, being only instruments, aids for human use. Croce argues that “a man of science is the embodiment of mental barbarism, produced by the substitution of schemes for concepts, small heaps of news for a philosophico-historical organism”; and that true knowledge occurs in the individual perception of reality, in reference to the real historical process, before and against any scientific conceptualization. In the long supremacy of the Italian idealistic tradition there is a radical separation of science from philosophy. Science has nothing to say to philosophy, and philosophy has nothing to say to science. They are two different regimes, which, in the end, are exact opposites. With Giovanni Gentile – who, besides being the most eminent Italian academic philosopher of his time, was minister of Public Education during Fascism, promoter of a School  Reform (1923) whose effects are still detectable nowadays – the influence of the Renaissance is still having a powerful effect, and, in particular, the idea that, notwithstanding Hegel’s assumption that philosophy is universal and international, a “national character” is always checkable in it. (Let me also remind you that the lasting effects of Gentile’s Reform are the following: the teaching of philosophy is organized under the Facoltà di Lettere (Faculties of Humanities) - which sanctioned philosophy as a humanistic discipline –; the teaching of philosophy through the history of philosophy; the coupling of history and philosophy in high school teaching).
And what about the times following the Second World War, an epoch of anti-spiritualistic and anti-metaphysical reaction, of acceptance of foreign philosophies and of a relatively progressive pluralism in our culture?  Ludovico Geymonat – who in the 50’ held the first chair of Philosophy of Science in our country, and started, together with Giulio Preti, a process of up-dating Italian culture towards the European philosophico-scientific learning – was the one who made logical empiricism known in Italy. He was also a Marxist. And, as chance would have it, he eventually countered the tradition of Galileo and Cattaneo – the latter being the most eminent Italian follower of the Enlightenment – with the most orthodox Marxist one, which underlined the continuity Vico-Spaventa-Labriola-Croce-Gramsci. Doing so, he supported the thesis of an admirable full coincidence between the great humanistic and historicist tradition of Italian culture with our great scientific trend. And are you willing to know what Francesco Barone – the author of a monumental work on the scientific philosophy of the Nineteenth century, substantially a sympathizer of scientific thought – wrote about neo-empiricism? He argued that “the neopositivistic attitude maims the organism of culture, prevents the understanding of its many manifestations not reducible to science, and while it aims at the coming of a bright epoch ridden of the ghosts of tradition, seems, on the contrary, to presage  the advent of a barbaric anti-humanism”.
Summing up. Italy lived through the Counter-reformation without having known the Reformation. Political and social reasons led to the late arrival of industrialisation, with enduring pockets of feudalism and peasant culture, succeeded by a difficult secularisation slowed down (alas) by the presence of the Vatican in our country. Italian philosophy suffered from the civil strife between Catholics and lay people (mainly Communists), feeling the urgency to have a militant philosophy “organic” to some social class or church, and under pressure to design “ideologies”. It is perhaps on account of this that Italy has had a disenchanted relationship with the concept of truth, often giving prevalence to the “Jesuit” spirit, according to which a suitable lie is better than an uncomfortable truth, and preferring first the humanistic cult of the auctoritas (the etymology is Latin, auctor – author -, and its cult means that the truth is to be found in books, and nowhere else), and then the pursuance of a contingent, and essentially agnostic, consensus gentium (consensual agreement). 
I hope you will forgive me for showing you the forest from above and for imposing on you my vision as an historian of philosophy.  If I had shown you the few trees that are interesting to the philosophy of science and epistemology from close up, you would have lost sight of the context and you would not have understood why they are shaped the way they are. The history of the philosophy of science in Italy is a story of lost battles against a series of dominant philosophies; philosophies that are all profoundly historicist (from Hegelian historicism variously adapted by Italian neo-Hegelians and Marxists, to the “historicity” of today’s Heidegger and Gadamer proselytes) and fundamentally anti-Enlightenment, exactly in the sense that we have seen expressed in Vico’s philosophy. It is a story of late importations that are often corrupted by the compulsive need to unite content with requirements from a quite different source.  Even when the imported views were asked to play a role that broke with tradition, and perhaps precisely because of this, they couldn’t help measuring their strength against the possible consequences for metaphysics, for human values and also for praxis. On stringent and detailed analysis, in general the preference has been for abstract lucubrations on science as a form of the spirit and on its relationships with religion and philosophy.  This is why one of the features that Italian philosophy of science shares – albeit more intensely - with the rest of philosophy is eclecticism: the numerous and at times extenuating attempts at reconciliation between empiricism and pragmatism, between existentialism and neopositivism, between phenomenology, trascendentalism and neoempiricism, between dialectical materialism and the new philosophy of science. All these attempts were intended to unite logical-empirical research, always considered to be insufficient in itself, with a global vision of culture, life and the human predicament.  It is also a story of limited professionalism (with the exception of an excellent Italian school of logic, figures in philosophy of science with a mathematical and scientific training are few and far between. But then it was the whole of Italian philosophy that held professionalism of little account, since none of its three acclaimed heroes - Vico, Croce and Gramsci - were philosophers by profession). It must also be said that our philosophy of science has made very few – and none of them significant - analytical contributions to the great and much-discussed themes of the Twenteeth century: empirical confirmation, causality, scientific explanation, the structure of theories, the scientific method, induction. Contributions to the philosophical foundations of new physics have been meagre, too, but this can also be attributed to the fact that Italian scientists – starting with the big names from Fermi to Marconi, and by contrast with what was happening in France and in Germany – hardly ever debated epistemological and foundational problems. 
In the end, historicist as well as ethical-political requirements prevailed for the majority  of our philosophers of science, and they can also be perceived considering which among the imported philosophico-scientific and epistemological currents have been more fortunate in Italy. The most widespread of these are: Popperism (apart from Popper, Lakatos, whose philosophy not by chance was considered to be an audacious mixture of ingredients borrowed from Kuhn, Popper and Quine, and seasoned with a pinch of Hegel and Marx in a Hungarian sauce); French so-called “historical epistemology”, from Duhem to Bachelard to Foucault to Serres; the “post-Kuhnian” philosophy of science, precisely because it is historicist and non-technical. Besides, Italian philosophy of science has welcomed all the theories that promised to account for the revolutionary aspects of conceptual change and for complex states (our epistemologists were strangely fascinated by the theory of catastrophes, the theory of chaos, the theory of complex systems, various holisms and, lastly, the theories of Nobel prize winner, physicist Ilya Prigogine; the “nuovelle alliance” between science and literature promised by him was also greeted very favourably, appearing as a sort of reverse reductionism, with anthropology and ethics at its centre, and above all as a “re-enchantment of nature”); Italian philosophy of science has also welcomed all the philosophies that did not forget the subject, that were not too naturalistic, that were not too empiricist (there has never been a modern-day Italian empiricism. The conclusive tone of the first part of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind has always carried great weight with respect to empiricism; and today it is the sentence of Derrida, according to whom empiricism can never aspire to be philosophy); and, at last, all the fundamentally instrumentalist and nominalist attitudes towards science, ever stripped, however, of that objectivistic sense present in influential versions of conventionalism.

The reception of psychoanalysis in the Italian philosophical culture is a case in point. Psychoanalysis and psychology shared the fate of every science for a long time, with the aggravating factor that they were suspected to be concerned with the “soul” and the “spirit” (rather than with human mind and human emotion). The spirit, insisted Croce, was the proper study of philosophy alone. Only an “empirical psychology”, a descriptive science of psychic phenomena without philosophical implications, would have been regarded as admissible. Psychology was to remain the handmaiden of philosophy. And not only that: “psychologism” was also to be swept out of literary criticism and aesthetics.
Philosophers’ knowledge of psychology and psychoanalysis was for a long time second hand and very superficial. During the Fascist period and the cultural hegemony of idealism and spiritualism, psychology and psychoanalysis suffered from lack of attention and a preconceived denial, like everything that appeared to be the outcome of positivism. I remind you that Croce spoke of Fechner’s psychophysics as “a diversion, no more important than playing solitaire or collecting stamps”. He regarded psychoanalysis as a pseudo-science, an “empirical hotchpotch”, with some practical use perhaps, but theoretically doomed by its “metaphysical” claims (in his view, the unconscious was identical to an inadmissible “unknowable”, and “health” and “sickness” dangerously confused in psychoanalysis). Gentile had spoken of psychology generally as a “philosophia pigrorum” (philosophy for the lazy). In his 1923 Reform he excluded the teaching of psychology in upper middle schools. Later he himself allowed an entry on psychology for the Italian Encyclopaedia of Science, Letters and Art that he directed, in which psychoanalysis, behaviourism, the theory of form, Russian psychology and Piaget were not even mentioned (and this was in 1935!). He commissioned the Trieste psychoanalyst Weiss to write a separate entry on psychoanalysis, but then provided the article with a double bibliography (unique in the entire work). One of these was prepared by the author, perhaps the only orthodox Freudian in Italy at that time, and the other was drawn up by the editor, listing anti-Freud works.
The role of Catholic culture and the Church in the introduction of psychoanalysis into Italy was different. It is not generally known that the neo-scholastic Agostino Gemelli, professor of psychology and an intriguing and influential priest, showed his awareness of some of Freud’s theories as early as 1910, when he wrote (in Latin) two treatises on medical-pastoral theology for use by confessional priests and directed at a sound “ministry of souls”. Later, the works on psychoanalysis of French theologians and moralists, such as Dalbiez and Maritain, were read closely in Italy and assumed an important role in the spread of Freudian theories, especially as regards the way of treating them. That is, there was concern to keep psychoanalytic doctrine (to be regarded with suspicion on account of its pansexualism, materialism and Darwinism) distinct from treatment method (to be accepted with caution, but which basically confirmed the old religious teachings that the soul must take care of the soul).
In the period following the Second World War, Italian Marxists as a matter of dogma imported Pavlov’s theories of conditioned reflexes from the Soviet Union as “official” psychology, and they continued to be hostile to psychoanalysis and to all other schools of psychology for a long time. After the 1960s, the Marxists became more open in their attitude to psychoanalysis, mostly towards the Frankfurt School interpretations of it, with a pronounced tendency to regard psychoanalysis as a comprehensive view of man and society; and later, in the wake of the so-called “school of suspicion”, which joined the teachings of Nietzsche, Marx and Freud, as a tool for the critique of ideology. The historicity of psychic functions and psychic individuality, as well as the historicity of normal and pathological categories, entered the debate at the end of the 1960s through reference to existentialism and phenomenology, rather than to the Marxist tradition. At the beginning of the 1970s, in Italy there was a strong anti-psychiatry movement in which psychoanalysis itself was involved, and the disregard of the genesis and nature of mental illness became entrenched, in line with the phenomenological-existentialist trend. The movement as a whole resulted in the revolutionary law 180, which ratified the dismantling of the mental hospital structure (places of marginalisation and oppression) and the entirely political scheme devised for reintegration and treatment (in general, “talking” cure) of the mentally ill. This came about (to quote one of the less dogmatic protagonists of the time) through reliance on an “efficientist bureaucracy” and on an “operative spontaneism” in an “alarming absence of scientific elaboration”.
With the 1980s, philosophical reflection on psychoanalysis became less episodic and more precise. Now, from a reading of Freud as anthropologist and theorist of discontent in civilised society (more closely corresponding to the ethical and sociological concerns of preceding years) we passed to a closer reading of Freudian interpretative and “technical” texts. But the prevailing philosophy in Italy by then was hermeneutics. It seems that the outcome most shared by our philosophers, after what was termed a “long leave from Hegel”, was the encounter with the philosophies of Nietzsche and Heidegger, and later, those of Benjamin, Blumenberg, Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, Lévinas, and Wittgenstein. From the long Italian tradition came the revival of the Turin school of Luigi Pareyson, an existentialist and original interpreter of a kind of personalism and of negative theology, who taught several scholars, from Gianni Vattimo (the most eminent Italian philosopher at the moment, thought highly of  by Richard Rorty), to Umberto Eco. The flag of “weak thought” - it is a fortunate slogan coined by Vattimo himself - was proudly waved by Vattimo against the rationality of a so-called “scientism”; which he identified, in a rather shallow way, with the legacy of Kantism, neo-empiricism, the phenomenology of early Husserl and all the philosophies who took logic seriously; with the promise that it would become the flag of a true hermeneutic koine.  In 1979 a book of essays entitled Crisi della ragione was published. In this book we find a series of writings by Italian authoritative philosophers and men of letters, all of them in agreement as regards assigning a central role to psychoanalysis in an attempt to escape from the prison of “classical reason” (by which was meant the reason we find in Newtonian science, and also in classical logic, in causalism and in methodologism). This recalls once more the so-called “crisis of science” between the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries and a supposed flowering – with Mach and Einstein, and later, Cantor, Brouwer and Dedekind – of epistemological models inspired by “scientific imagination”, closely linked to human “practices”, and not susceptible to codification in a collection of prescriptive rules. Literature as well, from Musil to Beckett (with a particular consideration also for Sherlock Holmes and his “abductive” inferences), was part of this “pluralistic opening” of methods and strategies of reasoning. Not even now psychoanalysis was a “subject” to be submitted to epistemological scrutiny, or to have its claims to be compared with those of science, but had itself become a tool for assessing and revising the logical and epistemological standards that make up the monolithic identity of classical reason. Having digested Lacan, content to have found something of Heidegger in psychoanalysis, philosophers now discovered Matte-Blanco’s “bi-logic”, alongside, needless to say, a hermeneutic Freud, by now more and more man of letters than scientist. The fundamental teaching of Freud is claimed to rest in having shown us an object – the psyche – which cannot become an object of traditional knowledge without losing its specificity, and which is resistant to any assault of an explanatory or reductive reason; briefly, and oddly indeed, the fundamental teaching of Freud is in his having restored the original “stupor” of knowing to us; of having pointed out, along with Heidegger, “the fundamental emotional tonality” of knowledge. 
In 1974, the philologist and militant Marxist Sebastiano Timpanaro wrote Il Lapsus freudiano, a pamphlet openly denouncing the epistemological, scientific and ideological limits of Freudian theories, which sold well in the English-speaking world. His materialist and neo-enlightenment message fell into a void that would not to be filled in the years to come. Indeed, this great man, who loved intelligent argument and challenge, who favoured not only ascertained “facts” but also the concreteness of common sense, who shunned vagueness and rhetoric and who dared to find an exemplar of rationality in science, now seems more and more “foreign” in Italy. He was right to denounce the unjust “conspiracy of silence” surrounding his work on psychoanalysis. In the meantime, psychoanalysis was going further and further down the road towards literature and, in the wake of an acclaimed “narrative turn”, going definitively further away from critical, epistemological scrutiny.
With the benefit of hindsight, the story I’m briefly going to tell you now is not just an anecdote. In 1931, Giovanni Papini, a strange scholar, anti-Croce and with leanings to futurism, wrote about a curious interview, undoubtedly imaginary, with Freud. In this piece, all the work of the great Viennese was suddenly revealed to him in a very pleasant light: psychoanalysis was nothing other than “transferred literary vocation” and Freud was “a literate by instinct and doctor by necessity”. It was, moreover, Heine, Zola, Mallarmé, symbolism and, later, Goethe’s philosophy of nature that allegedly inspired him to his most original discoveries. The weary, depressed Freud was old when Papini pretended to meet him, and he admitted unequivocally his true nature as artist. Papini was simply writing something to spite Croce. He didn’t know he was painting a portrait of Freud that Italian culture, and now Italian philosophy, have never taken down from the wall.
As matter stands, I am sure that professor Gruenbaum quite clearly understands why there were so many problems when we proposed a translation into Italian of his seminal 1984 book on the epistemology of psychoanalysis. I had already a contract with a publisher in my hands when, all of a sudden, there was countermand. A few psychologists had even threatened to submit (sic!) their resignation from the scientific committee of the publishing house. Luckily we found another one that managed to escape “The Inquisition”!.
To conclude. Is anything changing in Italian philosophy? I wouldn’t imagine so. Recently, as often happens in Italy, certain well known philosophers have got themselves into newspapers and magazines talking about philosophy today and in the future. I will relieve you from a public controversy on the legacy of the Enlightenment, now published in a little book, in which it emerged that we cannot talk of “rationality” except after Nietzsche, Heidegger, Jünger and Thomas Mann; that we must enrich Enlightemnent with the more recent acquisition that science and technology are the same thing; and that the great followers of the Enlightenment include William Blake, Hegel and, obviously, Vico! However, it is indicative of how much Gianni Vattimo and Massimo Cacciari, the two contemporary philosophers most widely translated, including by yourselves, have given the philosophers of the future to think about. Vattimo states that philosophy is at a crossroads, that either we start again from Fichte or we start from Schelling; and Cacciari peremptorily invites all of us philosophers to declare where we stand – with Heidegger or with Emanuele Severino (a neo-Parmenidean and amongst the best known interpreters of contemporary nihilism). In this public dabate, the voice of Italian philosophers of science and analytic philosophers is scarcely to be heard, and nor is the voice of historians of philosophy, who are accustomed, like Pontius Pilate, to “wash their hands” of such things.
Since the middle of the 1980s, nevertheless, something has been changing in both philosophy of science and analytical philosophy in Italy. This is undoubtedly the result of “globalisation”, which is progressively discouraging autarky and cultural provincialism. And it is not mere rhetoric to say that the Pittsburgh Centre has played a fundamental part in the present change in my country. The most significant figures in this renewal passed through the Centre. Diego Marconi, philosopher of language, was reared in the school of Pareyson and Vattimo, and, like many Italian philosophers in the 1960s, “settled his account” with Hegel, with dialectics and with contradiction. His meeting with Nick Rescher and Pittsburgh changed him profoundly. He is now an internationally famous philosopher (his recent book, Lexical Competence, was first published by MIT), and his school of “analytics” in Turin and Vercelli is producing important results in semantics, philosophical logic and philosophy of mind. Paolo Parrini was a student of Giulio Preti, the Italian philosopher who struggled the hardest to open Italian philosophy to a logical-scientific forma mentis, and, in my view, the only post-war Italian philosopher worth knowing abroad. Parrini, even before visiting Pittsburgh, at the same time as the late lamented Alberto Coffa (the dates are clear), opened an important new seam of critical and historical reassessment of scientific philosophy in the Twentieth century. This now attracts eminent scholars from all over the world, all working together – even when there are disagreements of interpretation – in a spirit of co-operation and dialogue, favoured by their common point of reference at the Pittsburgh Archive. I should also mention a new generation of young Italian scholars, visiting here in Pittsburgh, who are now following brilliant careers and are appreciated all over the world. However, it is the Florence Center for the History and Philosophy of Science, which I have directed since 1985, that has benefited most from collaboration with Pittsburgh; through the promotion of joint successful initiatives, the exchange of visiting scholars, the mutual assistance to students and researchers, and above all for having brought the most outstanding figures in the fields of philosophy of science and history of science to Italy. My only regret is that our common friend Marcello Pera, another leading scholar who sharpened his tools and refined his learning here in Pittsburgh, after sowing his ideas amongst his students in Pisa, decided to leave philosophy and take up a much more important post, namely, that of President of the Senate of the Republic. A pity for philosophy and a pity for politics too, because it is my firm conviction that Pera has gone into politics by the wrong door (but you can’t learn everything in Pittsburgh). Without these exchanges and ties with the Pittsburgh Centre, and I repeat this without the slightest hint of flattery, epistemology and philosophy of science in Italy would not be enjoying the present period of great intensity and promise. Unless everything will not be thwarted by our current university reform. A colleague of mine and expert in the field of University legislation, has recently written that in Italy, thanks to the reform under way, “we are practically witnessing the end of philosophy of science” (and perhaps the end of philosophy tout court). Our philosophy students will no longer be able to choose a course with exams in physics or mathematics or cognitive sciences, but only in history and literature (besides those in philosophy). That philosophy belongs with the Humanities is going to be definitively ratified. In Italy we will continue to educate historians of philosophy and, in particular, due to the scarce number of annual matriculations, to regard philosophy as a kind of propedeutic study to other specialisations (including – listen to this – the didactics of philosophy, another bizarre and unfortunate invention of our pedagogues). 
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